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of Political Change in Thailand
-Some Conceptual and Theoretical Reassessments-
Thak CHALOEMTIARANA*
Previous authoritative works on modern Thai politics have failed to give adequate stress
to the importance of historical and cultural constraints on the nature of its development.!)
They tend to concentrate upon functional aspects of the modern political system and mis-
judge conceptually the central idea of modernization and development in the Thai context
which should be subsumed under the traditional concern for the consolidation of power and
leadership position. 2) Thai politics should be considered and understood from the historical
perspective involving a study of traditional political values which were faced with stresses and
strains from the impact of modernism. On the paradigmatic level, the main characteristics
of modern Thai politics could be briefly listed as follows-authority is patrimonial and
absolute; political behavior is affected by the interplay of royal, military, and bureaucratic
power relations; the traditional political structure is hierarchical and segmented; the rigidity
of the political structure persists in the face of rapid social change which causes tension and
eventual political instability. 3)
Historically, the development of the concept of power, authority and legitimacy took two
forms. Firstly, the "traditionally" Thai reification of the patriarchial system was argued and
substantiated by the now famous stone inscription attributed to King Ramkhamhaeng of
Sukhothai through which the ruler was idealized as the father-figure (phokhun) who rules
over his domain in a paternalistic yet autocratic manner. 4) This basis for power and authority
* Visiting Scholar, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
1) Examples are David Wilson, PoHtics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); Frank C.
Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965); Fred W. Riggs,
Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic PoHty (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); and
William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Instz'tutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East-
West Center Press, 1966).
2) For an exception note the iconoclastic Norman Jacobs, Modernization without Development: Thailand as
an Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger,1971).
3) The future of this paradigm is at present in doubt. The politics of the post-1960's is marked by the emer-
gence of new socio-economic groups and conflicting ideologies. These forces have created a great impact
upon the prevailing structure of Thai politics, threatening to replace it with a socio-economic and political
structure defined in terms of class and cross-cutting interests transcending traditional boundaries of politi-
cal segmentation. For an interesting study reflecting this change see Benedict Anderson, "Withdrawal
Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup," Bulletz'n of Concerned Asian Scholars,
IX (July-September, 1977), pp.13-30.
4) See Damrong Rachanuphab, "Laksana kanpokkhrong prathet sayam tae boran [Ancient Siamese Admini-
stration]", a speech delivered before the Samaikhayachan Samakhom, Bangkok, October 8,1927.
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was to be replaced during the Ayutthaya period by the deva raja cult influenced by court
Brahmans of the Khmer civilization. 5) Through the process of Khmerization or Hindu-
ization, the king laid claims to be a personification of cosmic values and hence deriving power
and legitimacy from the religio-cosmological interpretation. This framework of royal au-
thority was transferred to the early Ratanakosin period where changes were made during the
Chakkri Reformation of Rama IV, and particularly later in Rama V's reign. 6) As deva raja,
the king had become increasingly isolated from the public and deviated from the phokhun
ideal type. However, during the reign of Rama IV several measures were instigated to bring
the position of the king closer to his subjects. Taboos against looking at or touching the king
were removed, and his subjects were allowed to directly petition the king, reminiscent of the
practices described in the Ramkhamhaeng inscription. 7) Rama V went one step further by
releasing his subjects from the obligation of prostrating themselves before the king. Never-
theless, the monarch still retained the aura of the absolutist god king.
The Revolution of 1932, while effectively depriving the royalty of its centrality in the
process of politics, did not in effect bring about a revolution in the modern political sense.
What is significant seems to be the stress exerted upon the concept of power and legitimacy
heretofore invested in the personage of the monarch. The new leaders had to present an
alternative legitimizing source. The foreign idea of constitutionalism was apparently weak
because of the fact that it was secular and not thoroughly appreciated by the general public.
There were attempts to disregard the historical and traditional position of the throne as a
legitimizing institution, even to the point of suggesting a republican form of government.
In the end, as their predecessors of 1911 had done before them,8) the leadership within the
People's Party backed down and retained the monarchy, asked for its forgiveness and allowed
it to exercise sanctioning prerogatives of legitimization. The constitution became not the
work and toil of the people but a royal gift from a benevolent king. And being a royal gift,
the throne maintained a moral superiority over the leaders of the People's Party.
This aspect of the genesis of modern Thai politics must be understood clearly. As the
5) James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior", in William J. Siffin, ed., Toward a Comparative Study
of Public Administration (The Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957), p. 284.
6) The traditional roots of this change came during the period of king Trailok of Ayutthaya in the 1450's
whose administrative reforms created functionally specialized ministries. Under Trailok, rationalization
of the sakdina graded hierearchization of the social structure was also carried out.
7) King Mongkut or one of his sons would appear at the plalace wall four times a month to give alms to the
poor and receive petitions from the people. See Royal Proclamations of 1856, 1858 in Prachum Prakat
Ratchakan thz'si [Collected Royal Proclamations of the 4th reign], 1851-1857, pp. 263,264.
8) The Revolt of 1911 or Kabot R S. 130 was an attempt made by young army officers to overthrow absolute
monarchy to find new political means to modernize Thailand. They were distressed with the situation in
Siam compared to other countries especially Japan in Asia. The plot never got off the ground as the secret
was leaked. Arrests were made. Correspondence smuggled out of prison indicated how the plotters were
later grateful to the king for dealing with them fairly. For this, several of the plotters confirmed their
allegience to the throne. See Lieutenants Rian Sichan and Net Phunwiwat, Kabot R. S. 130 [The
Revolt of RS. 130] (Bangkok: National Student Center of Thailand, 1974).
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gracious donor, the monarchy retained a foothold in the Thai constitutional adventure. The
image of the patriarchial king was retained by this action underwhich both king and subject
continued to maintain interlocking moral obligations to guide and determine the future of
constitutionalism in Thailand. 9) Thus the Thai monarchy, unlike those in other constitution-
al systems retained a special position in the new political system whereby the throne was not
merely the object of politics, but in fact the "subject" of politics. 10) Thus any true political
understanding of modern Thai politics must take into account that the special position of the
monarchy is a requisite of the political system.
The tension between the monarchy and the leadership of the People's Party remained
throughout the period from 1932 to 1957. In particular, Marshal Phibunsongkhram who
took over real control of national leadership from the mid-1930's tried first to ignore and
undermine the throne's precarious position as the traditional legitimizer of political power by
imposing upon the Thai society modern concepts of the state and the leader. This tension
between king and minister was not satisfactorily removed until the coming of age of Marshal
Sarit Thanarat who staged a coup against Phibun in 1957 and subsequently took power in
1958.
The dualism between the authority of the king and his chief minister, and the traditional
dualism inherent in the rival concepts of king as deva raja and phokhun became the central
concern of the new leadership under Sarit. ll) The traditional concepts of power and leader-
ship were conceptually and pragmatically secularized to accomodate the two spheres of
leadership where the king retained his cosmological and historical links with legitimation
symbolism while the de facto non-royal leadership derived its legitimacy from both the above
institutional symbolism as well as the more mundane aspect of secular patriarchy. Thus in
this modern sense, the Sarit period was significant for the position of the prime minister
became the preponderant part of national leadership having tapped both cosmological sanction
through the close association with and receiving active/tacit support from the throne while
also deriving letigimacy and support from the public through Sarit's own systematic pro-
motion (by demonstration) of the atavistic concept of the national leader as phokhun. 12)
This development could be viewed as the normalization of conflicting concepts of leadership
9) For an account of the promoter's dealings with Rama VII after the 1932 coup see Lt. Gen. Prayoon Pha-
monmontri, "The Policitcal Change of 1932," in Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed., Thai Polz"t£cs, 1932-1957
(Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978), pp. 36-50. Also note Rama VII's detailed
criticisms of Pridi's Economic Development Plan in Ibid., pp. 193-236. The king labeled the plan as
communist-inspired which led to the temporary exile of Pridi.
10) See Benedict Anderson's argument in his "Studies of the Thai State," a paper submitted to the Conference
on the State of Thai Studies, Chicago, March 30, 1978, pp. 20-27.
11) For a detailed account see Thak Chaloemtiarana, "Khwam khz'tthang kanmuang khong chomphon Sarit
Thanarat lae rabob kanmuang baeb phokhun uppatham [The Political Thinking of Field Marshal Sarit
Thanarat and the politics of paternalism]" in Sombat Chantornwong and Rangsan Thanaphonphan, eds.,
Rak muangthai [Love Thailand] (Bangkok: Thai Textbook Project, 1976), pp. 35-82.
12) The argument of political atavism was first used by Toru Vano, "Sarit and Thailand's Pro-American
Policy," The De'velop£ng Economies, VI (September 1963), pp. 284-299.
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based on historical, cosmological, and patriarchial ideals and the ahistorical and socially
alien concept of modern constitutionalism. Lip service was given to constitutionalism and
democratic processes while the actual practice of politics became in reality one of despotic
paternalism fashioned from converging historical heritages of patrimonialism and the
leadership's militaristic background.
The Chakkri Reformation or modernization has yet to be fully understood. However,
several implications of the reformation could be isolated. Firstly, while it is facile to view
the reformation from the standpoint of a traditional society adjusting to the encroachment of
Western colonialism and the need to clearly demarcate Siam as a territorially and admin-
istratively distinct nation-state, one must not lose sight of the position of the monarchy during
the early part of Rama V's reign where the king needed the machinery as well as the structure
to consolidate his eroded hold on actual political power which had been under the control of
several powerful aristocratic families. 13) Modernization in this sense could be viewed as
attempts of the monarchy to establish means to consolidate its own weak position.
Secondly, it is perhaps misleading to view the modernization of the Chakkri Reformation
as "national" modernization, although there are certain grounds for this line of theorizing.
But more meaningful perhaps, one should see that this consolidation had led to the creation
of two institutional power structures which would ultimately compete with the throne for
nationalleadership.14) By these I refer to the establishment of the modern bureaucracy and
the modern army.
Nothing illuminates better the nature of such modernization than an examination of the
historical development of the Thai military. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Siam's
traditional enemies had been pacified and colonized. The creation of a modern and pro-
fessional army seemed a moot issue in view of the military potential of the Western powers
in the area. Siam was in no position to resist militarily against Western designs if the case
ever arose. I will not go into the controversial subject as to how Siam escaped direct colo-
nization. Suffice it to say, the modern army was created not so much for external warfare
or the defense of national integrity, but for the purposes of supporting and extending royal
authority over a traditionally loosely-held realm.
Traditionally, the armies serving the Chakkri kings in the late eighteen and early
nineteenth centuries were composed of foreign personnel. 15) And by this time the external
security of the kingdom was gunmteed by the Western imperial powers. Siam's traditional
rivals had been neutralized by the colonial powers, and by this mere fact, the role of the
modern Thai army took on the character of an internal army to be deployed internally for
13) For further discussion see Thak Chaloemtiarana, "The Evolution of the Monarchy and Government: In-
stitutional Conflicts and Change," in Lauristan Sharp, ed., Asia (Asia Society, N.Y.), (Spring 1976), pp.
41-56.
14) Ibid.
15) Noel Battye, "The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910," Ph. D. Dissertation, Cornell
University, 1974, pp. 20, 21.
403
consolidation purposes, a function that has endured to the present time. One of the earliest
moves of king Chulalongkon along matters of the military was to create a special royal
bodyguard unit which was well-equipped and professionally-trained which could be seen as
an important base for support for the king's faction in trying to wrest power from the aristo-
cratic families. 16) Noel Battye states that Chulalongkon was aware of the importance of the
army in political terms as to provide adequate force to "put down unlawful persons within
the country" ,17) In this respect, the decree for military conscription of 1905 could be better
understood from the perspective of a state requiring enforcement firepower to maintain
internal stability threatened by the Holy Man and Shan rebellions in 1902 to which Battye
notes that the rebellions prompted and supported the argument "for a national conscript army
as an essential instrument of internal governance".18) Thus under these unauspicious
conditions of birth, the modern Thai army was a political instrument of the state, and pre-
cisely because it did not have external functions, it followed logical steps of development to
eventually dominate the domestic political process. 19) The coup of 1932 marked this turning
point.
Under the normal circumstances of an open democratic political system with roots deeply
embedded in corresponding social values, the professionalization of the military corps could
have evolved. However, such was not the case. Democracy was an alien principle, au-
thoritarianism was traditional, thus indigenous. Leadership of the People's Party vacillated
between the urge to nurture the seeds of a democratic system and/or reverting to old author-
itarian values. In this struggle, the military faction was superior and proceeded to pursue
its basic function of an internal army, only now, it became the political instrument of its own
officers bent upon seeking and maintaining their own power status. 20) In this sense, the
16) Ibid., p. 133.
17) Ibid., p. 132.
18) Ibid., p. 430. Battye posits that "there is no reason to disbelieve the report of the British Consul that
the army, a novelty on the Siamese scene, was created for 'internal rather than external military purposes.'"
Ibid., p. 226. Regarding the army's domestic role, Ben Anderson cited Battye and Benjamin Batson,
"The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam," Ph. D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1977, that in the
mid-1880's young reformers with European education strongly supported the modernization ofthe military
in order to push through domestic reforms against conservative opposition and the provinces. At the same
time they realized the futility of organizing a modern army to defend the country against the West. (Bat-
tye, pp. 263f.) He noted that Batson (p. 202) brings to attention an issue raised by Prince Boworadet
before Rama VII that subversive propaganda could turn military officers against the monarchy. This
was discussed in 1928, perhaps reflecting on the events of 1911. See Anderson, "Studies of the Thai
State," footnote 23.
19) For studies on the Thai military consult David Wilson, "The Military in Thai Politics," in John J. Johnson,
ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962),
pp.253-276; Claude E. Welch Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Milz'tary Role and Rule (North Scituate:
Duxbury Press, 1974); Moshe Lissak, Milz'tary Role in Modernization: Civil-Milz'tary Relations in Thai-
land and Burma (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); and Fred von der Mehden, "The Military and
Development in Thailand," Journal of Comparative Administration, II (November 1970), pp. 323-340.
20) The best example of this is the 1947 coup d'etat. For an account see Suchin Tantikun, Ratthaprahan Ph.
5.2490 [The 1947 Coup] (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1972).
404
T. CHALOEMTIARANA: Reflections on the Sarit Regime and the Process of Political Change in Thailand
growth of parliamentary democracy became stunted by the antiquarian concerns of military
leaders who inherited the old concepts of the Thai political system dictated from a hierarchical
and segmented perspective. Taking the segmentation of the Thai political structure as
a priori suited the authoritarian nature of military leaders. Politics seem from this frame-
work was clearly conjugal with the leaders' military socialization and the army's traditional
role in national administration.
The third consequence of the Chakkri Reformation was the effect it had upon the
structure of the political system. Toru Yano forcefully argued that the reformation of
Chulalongkorn caused the "segmentation" of the Thai political structure. The gist of his
argument was that "a segmented society emerged within the formal framework of a unified
nation-state--a segmented society that was clearly a product of the conscious efforts made to
establish a rigid hierarchical order under absolute monarchy."21) The functions of the royal
house became more important in policy-making as Chulalongkon encouraged princes to
study abroad and gain knowledge and competency to help the king administer the country.
In this way, the previous monopoly of power of the highly influential aristocratic families were
negated. In addition to this, the bureaucrats were reduced to strictly neutral functions.
Their role and behavior were closely regulated by law and ordinance. As members of a
modern functional administrative structure, they became privileged servants of the throne,
constituting a political stratum next in prestige to the royal house but quite removed in status
from the general public. The third segment was the peasantry who were given the status of
free citizenship but whose quality of life was not given much due official notice. 22)
Pursuing this line of argument, highly authoritarian rule was thus necessary to maintain
national integration and political stability. This system could be controlled as long as the
vast peasantry was not subjected to social and economic stresses. Demands on the admin-
istration were to be minimized (although they were never any real threat in the past). Tight
authoritarian rule was however needed to control the bureaucracy, both civilian and military,
as the nature of the modern functional bureaucracy was one which laid stress upon merito-
cratic values, as opposed to the ascriptive norms prescribed by the royal house and which
were inherent in the absolute monarchial system.
This conflict of values became critical within the confines of the bureaucracy as it began
to mature by the first half of the twentieth century. The Revolution of 1932 could be seen as
a manifestation of the conflict between the standards of "merit" and "blood".23) The
21) Toru Vano, "Political Structure ofa 'Rice-Growing State'," in Voneo Ishii, ed., Tha£land: A R£ce-Grow-
ing Society, Monographs of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, English-language
Series, No. 12, 1978, p. 122 and ff.
22) Vano points out that the benefit of education was not fully extended to the public. On a different level he
argues that "In modernizing, Thailand did not seek to encourage division in its political system. In
actuality, however, the Chakkri Reformation produced a system in which each stratum maintained its own
broad cultural pattern, which embraced political culture as well as lifestyle." Ib£d., p. 123.
23) Cf. Thak, "The Evolution."
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Chakkri Reformation while considered as modernizing could be understood clearly from the
viewpoint earlier stated that it was for power consolidation of the royal house. While it did
create non-royal bureaucrats on a grand scale, the top echelon was to remain within the grasp
of the royal family members. As long as the bureaucracy was in its nascent state and that
the royal princes were clearly capable administrators, the system continued to persist. How-
ever, this condition became exacerbated with the passing of time where civilian and military
offcials reached bureaucratic maturity and the royal house was not able to generate adequate
capable members following the death of Rama V.24)
While it is widely considered that the situation became endemic during Rama VII's
reign, the malady was the result of the policies of king Chulalongkon-policies which were
strikingly against professional and meritocratic standards. Again, policies regarding the
military best illustrates this observation. After the law on conscription was passed, civil
servants who were conscripted were given equivalent military ranks to the ones they had held
in the civilian bureaucracy. In 1906, for purposes of maintaining a grip upon the expansion
of the national army, rules of admission to the Military Academy were adjusted so that
candidates must be children of reputable parents who were sponsored and guaranteed by
commissioned government oflcials. Furthermore, by 1909 entrance to the three preparatory
grades of the military academy were limited exclusively to the sons of the royal house and
military officers. Also, a special class was set up for sons of royalty with the rank of Serene
Highness and above and male off-springs of military officers with commissioned or warrant
rank. Examinations were waived for this special class. 25)
However, royal nepotism ran deeper and more pervasive in the General Staff of the War
Ministry. In 1910, only members of the royalty held the ranks of General and Lieutenant
General; and six out of thirteen Major Generals were of royal birth. More than half of the
Divisional Commanders were from royal families. Many of these generals were extremely
young. 26 )
The 1932 Revolution while allegedly was an attempt to "revolutionize" the political
system in fact accepted it as more or le'>s on its own grounds and proceeded to modify it.
However, it should be conceded here that attempts were made by the civilian sector within
the People's Party under the leadership of Pridi to seriously contemplate representative
democracy; nevertheless, in the final analysis they had to give in to the political precon-
ditions of the system which grew out of the reformation years. Yano expresses the opinion
that
An important point to keep in mind here is that internal impetus toward
modernization was lacking in the Thai social structure. This meant that
24) The monogamous Rama VI and Rama VII did not leave any male heirs.
25) Battye, pp. 494, 495.
26) Ib£d., p. 519.
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political modernization had to be artificially devised and imposed from above,
and also that the establishment of an authoritarian dictatorship accompanied
by expansion of the bureaucracy (kharatchakan), and the practice of a for-
malistic constitutionalism, became inevitable. 27)
Political reality and constitutional idealism clashed in the end and the People's Party had to
make adjustments which ultimately forced it to rely more and more upon the experience and
insight of its leaders--itself a form of paternalism, and eventually paving the way for a return
to authoritarianism.
Political segmentation after 1932 took on new characteristics. The centrality of the royal
house in the decision-making arena was replaced by the new bureaucratic leaders who con-
stituted the government which in turn was responsible for the destiny of the state (rat). On
the second tier on the hierarchy, the bureaucracy rapidly expanded as an instrument of the
state and its bureaucratic leaders who sprang forth from within its own ranks. This particu-
lar feature led to the formulation of the Riggsian concept of Thailand being a bureaucratic
polity.28) Peasants were transformed into citizens of the state with rights and privileges,
not just merely having duties as before, under the new constitution. This aspect of citizenry
was also expressed in the proposals of Pridi in his Economic Plan of 1933.
Before the decade ended, the nature of political segmentation took another shift which
ironically prepared it for a return to pre-1932 authoritarianism. In 1939, through the dictates
of Phibun, the relationship between the state and the citizenry was again readjusted. Under
the ratthatzz'yom or State Convention/Preference Movement, the position of the state and its
representative, the government, was elevated to a paramount position above all other social
and political elements. 29) The concept of the state changed from that of a more legalistic
term to encompass a wider meaning with ideological implications. It became similar to such
ideas that became currency in Europe underlying the philosophical foundations of modern
totalitarianism. The position of the citizenry was relegated to secondary importance having
duties to perform for the glory and survival of the state. With this movement emerged the
strongman-savior concept ofphunam who became the guardian of the national will and whose
decisions were to be unquestionably followed and obeyed by a gratefUl public. Phibun was
well-suited for that role, having tapped the support of the army which performed its tra-
ditional political role as the base for power and instrument for controlling internal unrest.
From the absolutism of the Thai monarchs legitimized by historical and cosmological
sources, the phunam era brought forth the spectre of a non-royal and secular authoritarian
style of leadership which in its fundamental essence approximated, but yet alien to, tra-
ditional Thai political values. The position of the monarch in this system was considered
27) Vano, "Political Structure," p. 127.
28) Riggs, Thailand, op. cit.
29) For documents of this period in the English language, see Thak, Thai Po!itt'cs, pp. 244-316.
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spurious and inconsequential. As a promoter who was responsible for the demise of royal
authority, Phibun did not want nor permitted any rivalry to his recently acquired status.
This aspect of Phibun's relationship to the monarchy would continue th.roughout his career.
And as the throne remained the "subject" of politics and the ultimate source of traditional
legitimization, Phibun deprived himself of its support. This weakness in Phibun's political
armour was to be exploited by his successor, Sarit. 30)
The ratthaniyom campaign and the phunum cult faded out of the scene of Thai politics
following the defeat of Japan in World War II.3!) The interregnum of civilian rule between
1944-1947 was marked by attempts to institute democratic government. It proved however
to be short-lived as the army staged a coup d'etat in 1947 and brought back Phibun as Prime
Minister. For the next ten years, Phibun danced to a different tune as his power base
within the army was severed, having fallen into the hands of younger and more aggressive
officers. From dictator, Phibun turned democrat. He was able to maintain his position
with the support of the army whose younger generation of leaders were not ready to assume
political leadership. In addition, a facade of formalistic constitutionalism was maintained-
party politics was allowed, accompanied by parliamentary elections, "Hyde Park" speeches,
and regular "press conferences" orchestrated by the Prime Minister. In reality however,
Phibun used the police to harass his political enemies and to rig ballot boxes. At first, the
army was a tacit partner in this political repression and democratic farce, but as institutional
rivalry with the police intensified, and when the new army strongman, Sarit, saw his chance
of breaking away from Phibun "gracefully" and taking over power himself, the army with-
drew its support from the government. Exploiting public outcry against police corruption
and brutality, and Phibun's tampering with election results in 1957, the army staged a coup
and appointed a civilian caretaker government. By the following year, Sarit staged a coup
de main and proclaimed Thailand's second "Revolution". This marked the beginning of
Thailand's neo-classical authoritarian period, a time for despotic paternalism.
The leaders of the 1957 coup differed fundamentally from those of the 1932 group by the
fact that most were army officers who had had no real foreign educational experience. Their
political outlooks had been shaped almost exclusively by what had happened in Thailand.
They were naturally much less impressed than their predecessors with the ideas that Western
democracy was the final goal of political modernization. It was the members of the Sarit
1957 coup group who were responsible for shaping a new format of Thai politics which
endured until October 1973. Under Sarit's leadership a formal rationalization of "de-
mocracy in the Thai context" took place, a development that presents students of Thai
politics with a most challenging analytical problem.
With the exception of the Japanese scholar Toru Yano, no foreign academics have shown
30) See Thak, "Khwam khitthang kanmuang."
31) For the most recent study of this important period, consult Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and theJapa-
nese Presence, 1941-1945, ISEAS (Singapore), Research Notes and Discussions, No.6 (October 1977).
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interest in a systematic study of the important political implications of the period between
1957 to 1963, the Sarit years. Although Sarit's system was carried on after his death by
Marshal Thanom Kittikhachon, I feel that the above period laid the essential basis for the
system, and its study should thus provide a good understanding of the form and character of
modern Thai politics.
Although Sarit's ideas were never systematically formulated, it is nevertheless possible
to reconstruct the basic ideological tenets of his regime. In their most elementary form,
they revolved around Sarit's notion of pattiwat-Ioosely translated as revolution-and
phatthana (development/modernization). Sarit always argued that his coup in 1958 was
historically unique in that a revolutionary government was installed to carry out pattz'wat
and phatthana. Yet Sarit's pattiwat (and phatthana) had their own peculiar meanings for
him, very different from Western concepts of revolution and development wh ich involve
major social, political, and economic changes. Sarit's pattiwat was actually "reactionary"
in the sense that it encouraged political atavism, for Sarit's idea of a truly Thai political
order was based on the three-tiered segmented socio-political system defined in terms of
lv-t/ratthaban (state/government), kharatchakan (bureaucracy), and prachachon (people).
With such view of the political system in mind, Sarit's policies and programs were aimed at
maintaining the boundaries between hierarchical sectors while the process of phatthana was
applied; and that phatthana was meant to reinforce pattiwat. Development and modern-
ization were to be extensions of regime paternalism and great care was to be taken to see that
change did not undermine the integrity of traditional boundaries of the political system.
The difficulty inherent in Sarit's ideology lay, of course, in the fact that his conception
of the political system was essentially static, and thus vulnerable to rapid social change.
While Sarit's phatthana was initially devised as a paternalistic program of controlled change,
the real consequences were hard to contain and predict. Sarit's ideology, which assumed
that socio-economic and political systems are naturally compatible and can be easily juxta-
posed in one entity, basically denied the dynamic interaction between the two. The in-
congruity of economic development and political traditionalism built up growing tensions
in Thai society, especially after Sarit's death. For either the political system would have to
adjust itself to socio-economic change or the regime would have to employ coercive measures
to suppress such change. The dramatic events of the 1970's in Thailand are indicative of the
tensions between the two systems.
Sarit's impact on Thai political development is not one which could readily receIve
accolade. His rule was harsh, repressive, despotic, and inflexible. Yet we must make clear
assessments of his position in the development process of modern Thai politics. It is neces-
sary that scholars answer the questions regarding Sarit's popularity which transcended his
distasteful tight-fisted rule; we must also note the system's limitations and built-in flaws
which eventually led to its own disintegration. By answering these questions we would be
able to understand the nature of modern Thai politics and glimpse at certain aspects within
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the system which had been inherited from the past and passed on to the present.
Criticisms have been raised regarding the study of the so-called Sarit system. Most
critics have been concerned with normative issues of Sarit as a despicable individual, that his
regime was an intolerable experience, and that the scholar should discharge his debts to society
by exposing Sarit for what he was-a greedy and selfish dictator-to help prevent further
recurrences of this pattern and style of leadership. While I share many of their concerns, as
a scholar, one must not attempt to indict or eulogize the subject under study. One should
attempt to try to study what Sarit had implemented politically that made him effective as a
political leader who was respected, hated, obeyed, and above all, feared. It is easy for us to
attribute compliance to fear of dictatorial powers alone. There appears to be that "elusive
quality" in the Sarit leadership, enough to raise the issue of whether Sarit was an anachro-
nism, for it is still common even today to hear remarks that political uncertainty in Thailand
could be stabilized by a leader like Sarit. He remains a controversial prototype upon which
political leaders are measured. This enigma needs and dictates academic exploration. 32)
On the theoretical level, one should not merely search for the uniquely Thai aspect of the
Sarit leadership. I believe that an understanding of the politics of this period in Thailand
would contribute to a wider knowledge of modern patrimonial systems-societies which have
been affected or infected by modernism while their recent past political values and traditions
have been paternalistic, militaristic, and authoritarian.
32) See Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: the PoNt£cs of Despotz"c Faternalz'sm (Bangkok: Social Science
Association of Thailand, forthcoming).
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